{"product_id":"bargaining-over-the-bomb-the-successes-and-failures-of-nuclear-negotiations","title":"Bargaining over the Bomb: The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cblockquote\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003eNuclear agreements like the Iran deal can work, according to this book, which develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. It argues that existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining and that credible agreements can exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate. The model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons. \u003c\/blockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e                                                            \u003cstrong\u003eFormat\u003c\/strong\u003e: Paperback \/ softback\u003cbr\u003e                              \u003cstrong\u003eLength\u003c\/strong\u003e: 224 pages\u003cbr\u003e                              \u003cstrong\u003ePublication date\u003c\/strong\u003e: 21 February 2019\u003cbr\u003e                              \u003cstrong\u003ePublisher\u003c\/strong\u003e: Cambridge University Press\u003cbr\u003e                          \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003eNuclear agreements, such as the Iran deal, have the potential to be effective in preventing nuclear proliferation over time. While it may seem that there are incentives for countries to cheat, formal bargaining models developed in this book suggest that credible agreements can be reached through concessions and negotiations.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eExisting theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the role of bargaining in the process. William Spaniel, in his book, explores how credible agreements can be established in which rival states make concessions to discourage rising states from pursuing nuclear weapons. He argues that nuclear negotiations are valuable tools for counter-proliferation efforts.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe book not only demonstrates the existence of settlements but also highlights the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. It examines existing agreements and provides a baseline model for modeling other concerns related to nuclear weapons.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBy understanding the dynamics of bargaining and the factors that contribute to successful agreements, nuclear agreements can be a powerful tool in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting global security. However, it is important to note that the success of these agreements depends on a variety of factors, including the willingness of all parties to compromise and the commitment to upholding the terms of the agreement.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e                            \u003cstrong\u003eWeight\u003c\/strong\u003e: 350g                            \u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDimension\u003c\/strong\u003e: 152 x 228 x 16 (mm)                            \u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eISBN-13\u003c\/strong\u003e: 9781108701846                                                      \u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"WilliamSpaniel","offers":[{"title":"Paperback \/ softback","offer_id":44094852235514,"sku":"9781108701846","price":23.8,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0522\/4297\/2845\/products\/a4bf88ef259ec1cb25022bbcac7b5520.jpg?v=1627699693","url":"https:\/\/shulphink.com\/products\/bargaining-over-the-bomb-the-successes-and-failures-of-nuclear-negotiations","provider":"Shulph Ink","version":"1.0","type":"link"}