{"product_id":"force-content-and-the-unity-of-the-proposition-9780367613136","title":"Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cblockquote\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003eThis volume explores the force-content distinction and its implications for understanding force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. It challenges traditional views and opens up new ways of thinking about these concepts. \u003c\/blockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFormat\u003c\/strong\u003e: Paperback \/ softback\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eLength\u003c\/strong\u003e: 256 pages\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePublication date\u003c\/strong\u003e: 29 January 2024\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePublisher\u003c\/strong\u003e: Taylor \u0026amp; Francis Ltd\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe force-content dichotomy has been a central theme in the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. It is widely accepted that clauses in a conditional are not assertions but rather propositions, which are the forceless contents of forceful acts. However, recent debates have emerged regarding the unity of propositions. Some argue that propositions cannot be truth value bearers unless they are unified through the forceful act of a subject who takes a position on how things are. In response, others propose that propositions can be inherently forceful, but force can be canceled in certain contexts. Additionally, the meaning of assertoric, directive, and interrogative force indicators remains a topic of discussion.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis volume aims to advance the discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and explore new perspectives on force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. It will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind, and linguistics.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe force-content dichotomy has been a central theme in the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. It is widely accepted that clauses in a conditional are not assertions but rather propositions, which are the forceless contents of forceful acts. However, recent debates have emerged regarding the unity of propositions. Some argue that propositions cannot be truth value bearers unless they are unified through the forceful act of a subject who takes a position on how things are. In response, others propose that propositions can be inherently forceful, but force can be canceled in certain contexts. Additionally, the meaning of assertoric, directive, and interrogative force indicators remains a topic of discussion.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis volume aims to advance the discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and explore new perspectives on force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. It will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind, and linguistics.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe force-content dichotomy has been a central theme in the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. It is widely accepted that clauses in a conditional are not assertions but rather propositions, which are the forceless contents of forceful acts. However, recent debates have emerged regarding the unity of propositions. Some argue that propositions cannot be truth value bearers unless they are unified through the forceful act of a subject who takes a position on how things are. In response, others propose that propositions can be inherently forceful, but force can be canceled in certain contexts. Additionally, the meaning of assertoric, directive, and interrogative force indicators remains a topic of discussion.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis volume aims to advance the discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and explore new perspectives on force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. It will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind, and linguistics.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe force-content dichotomy has been a central theme in the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. It is widely accepted that clauses in a conditional are not assertions but rather propositions, which are the forceless contents of forceful acts. However, recent debates have emerged regarding the unity of propositions. Some argue that propositions cannot be truth value bearers unless they are unified through the forceful act of a subject who takes a position on how things are. In response, others propose that propositions can be inherently forceful, but force can be canceled in certain contexts. Additionally, the meaning of assertoric, directive, and interrogative force indicators remains a topic of discussion.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis volume aims to advance the discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and explore new perspectives on force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. It will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind, and linguistics.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe force-content dichotomy has been a central theme in the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. It is widely accepted that clauses in a conditional are not assertions but rather propositions, which are the forceless contents of forceful acts. However, recent debates have emerged regarding the unity of propositions. Some argue that propositions cannot be truth value bearers unless they are unified through the forceful act of a subject who takes a position on how things are. In response, others propose that propositions can be inherently forceful, but force can be canceled in certain contexts. Additionally, the meaning of assertoric, directive, and interrogative force indicators remains a topic of discussion.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis volume aims to advance the discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and explore new perspectives on force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. It will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind, and linguistics.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eWeight\u003c\/strong\u003e: 453g\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDimension\u003c\/strong\u003e: 229 x 152 (mm)\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eISBN-13\u003c\/strong\u003e: 9780367613136\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Shulph Ink","offers":[{"title":"Paperback \/ softback","offer_id":45179393999098,"sku":"9780367613136","price":42.83,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0522\/4297\/2845\/products\/noImage_1_cc02ef74-0588-4d62-b129-f82cbcebde35.jpg?v=1707753031","url":"https:\/\/shulphink.com\/products\/force-content-and-the-unity-of-the-proposition-9780367613136","provider":"Shulph Ink","version":"1.0","type":"link"}