{"product_id":"militia-order-in-afghanistan-guardians-or-gangsters","title":"Militia Order in Afghanistan: Guardians or Gangsters?","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cblockquote\u003eThis book explores the behavior of paramilitary groups in Afghanistan, analyzing their interactions with civilians and the factors that influence their actions. It argues that successful militia experiments require inclusion of local orders and complementary management, but when patrons ignore community controls, militias prey on civilians. It will be of interest to students of military and strategic studies, Asian politics, security studies, and International Relations. \u003c\/blockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e\n                                                            \u003cstrong\u003eFormat\u003c\/strong\u003e: Hardback\u003cbr\u003e\n                              \u003cstrong\u003eLength\u003c\/strong\u003e: 180 pages\u003cbr\u003e\n                              \u003cstrong\u003ePublication date\u003c\/strong\u003e: 19 July 2021\u003cbr\u003e\n                              \u003cstrong\u003ePublisher\u003c\/strong\u003e: Taylor \u0026amp; Francis Ltd\u003cbr\u003e\n                          \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003eIn the complex and multifaceted context of Afghanistan's counterinsurgency, the United States has relied on militias to provide order and stability in communities that have been cut off from weak central government institutions. However, the lucrative market of protection has posed a significant challenge to militia loyalty, leading many to engage in banditry, vendettas, and predation. This book delves into the varied militia experiments conducted in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2020, examining their outcomes through three sub-national case studies. It argues that successful militia experiments in Afghanistan required the inclusion of local orders, where communities had well-established social structures and accountability mechanisms in place. State patrons relied on these structures as a means to restrain militia behavior. Complementary management, where patrons collaborated with communities to establish strong accountability systems, was crucial in ensuring that militias did not prey on civilians.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eHowever, such environments were far from the norm. When patrons ignored community controls, militias exploited the market of protection, monopolizing it and engaging in predatory behavior against civilians. This book adds to the growing body of literature on the United States' experience in Afghanistan, focusing specifically on the interplay between states, communities, and militias. It will be of immense interest to students of military and strategic studies, Asian politics, security studies, and International Relations.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\n                            \u003cstrong\u003eWeight\u003c\/strong\u003e: 434g\n                            \u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDimension\u003c\/strong\u003e: 160 x 241 x 18 (mm)\n                            \u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eISBN-13\u003c\/strong\u003e: 9780367710453\n                            \n                          \u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Matthew P. Dearing","offers":[{"title":"Hardback","offer_id":44104721989882,"sku":"9780367710453","price":147.56,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0522\/4297\/2845\/products\/6ad09877b37cf94c1fc55450c765977d.jpg?v=1633660733","url":"https:\/\/shulphink.com\/products\/militia-order-in-afghanistan-guardians-or-gangsters","provider":"Shulph Ink","version":"1.0","type":"link"}