{"product_id":"negative-actions-events-absences-and-the-metaphysics-of-agency-9781108813730","title":"Negative Actions: Events, Absences, and the Metaphysics of Agency","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cblockquote\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003eThe book explores the problem of negative action, which challenges standard metaphysical theories of action that treat actions as events. It argues that many negative actions are not events but absences thereof and proposes unique ontological and semantic theories to solve the problem. The book provides a comprehensive understanding of negative actions, their nature, and their place in a theory of action. \u003c\/blockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFormat\u003c\/strong\u003e: Paperback \/ softback\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eLength\u003c\/strong\u003e: 246 pages\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePublication date\u003c\/strong\u003e: 10 November 2022\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePublisher\u003c\/strong\u003e: Cambridge University Press\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003eNegative actions, such as intentional omissions or refusals, appear to be genuine actions. The standard metaphysical theories of action are event-based, treating actions as events of a special kind. However, it seems that many (and perhaps all) negative actions are not events but absences thereof. This is the first book-length treatment of the problem of negative action. It surveys the recent literature and demonstrates how the problem is rooted in interconnected issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of action, and the philosophy of language. In particular, it connects competing views of the ontology of negative actions to competing views of the semantics of negative action sentences and develops unique ontological and semantic theories to solve the problem. It provides a comprehensive picture of the nature of negative actions, our thoughts and talk about them, and their place in a theory of action.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003eNegative actions, such as intentional omissions or refusals, appear to be genuine actions. The standard metaphysical theories of action are event-based, treating actions as events of a special kind. However, it seems that many (and perhaps all) negative actions are not events but absences thereof. This is the first book-length treatment of the problem of negative action. It surveys the recent literature and demonstrates how the problem is rooted in interconnected issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of action, and the philosophy of language. In particular, it connects competing views of the ontology of negative actions to competing views of the semantics of negative action sentences and develops unique ontological and semantic theories to solve the problem. It provides a comprehensive picture of the nature of negative actions, our thoughts and talk about them, and their place in a theory of action.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eWeight\u003c\/strong\u003e: 366g\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDimension\u003c\/strong\u003e: 152 x 228 x 18 (mm)\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eISBN-13\u003c\/strong\u003e: 9781108813730\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Jonathan D.Payton","offers":[{"title":"Paperback \/ softback","offer_id":44095050809594,"sku":"9781108813730","price":24.75,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0522\/4297\/2845\/products\/1668177445065_book.jpg?v=1668595220","url":"https:\/\/shulphink.com\/products\/negative-actions-events-absences-and-the-metaphysics-of-agency-9781108813730","provider":"Shulph Ink","version":"1.0","type":"link"}