{"product_id":"thieves-opportunists-and-autocrats-building-regulatory-states-in-russia-and-kazakhstan-9780197697771","title":"Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats: Building Regulatory States in Russia and Kazakhstan","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cblockquote\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003eThis book explores how Russia and Kazakhstan built regulatory state institutions on the ruins of the Soviet command and control system. It argues that politicians use institutions to balance elite demands for economic rents and popular demands for public goods and growth. Empirical analysis shows that formal regulatory institutions have a profound effect on economic outcomes and can help autocracies discipline state agencies and reinvigorate economic performance. \u003c\/blockquote\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFormat\u003c\/strong\u003e: Paperback \/ softback\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eLength\u003c\/strong\u003e: 320 pages\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePublication date\u003c\/strong\u003e: 18 October 2023\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePublisher\u003c\/strong\u003e: Oxford University Press Inc\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis book delves into the intricate challenges faced by Russia and Kazakhstan in constructing regulatory state institutions upon the remnants of the Soviet command and control system. Despite engaging in predatory and wasteful crony capitalism, these two nations managed to enhance their business climates and economic performance. To unravel these seemingly paradoxical outcomes, the book proposes a novel theory of authoritarian regulatory statehood. It suggests that politicians utilize state institutions as a means to reconcile competing elite demands for economic rents and popular demands for public goods and economic growth. A successful equilibrium between these two forces prevents elite subversion and popular revolts in the short term, while also ensuring elites' continued access to economic rents in the long run.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAn empirical analysis of nearly a million national and regional regulatory documents enacted in Russia and Kazakhstan between 1990 and 2020 reveals the profound impact of formal regulatory institutions constructed by autocrats. Moreover, during periods of political vulnerability, autocracies employ formal regulatory mechanisms to discipline state agencies responsible for policy implementation. By curtailing arbitrary policy implementation by the regulatory bureaucracy, autocrats can revitalize economic performance and rebalance elite and popular interests. The theoretical framework advanced in the book establishes a connection between the utilization of institutional instruments of policy implementation and the political survival strategy. This study effectively demonstrates that regulatory state building has emerged as a powerful tool for bolstering autocratic regimes and enhancing their long-term sustainability.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eWeight\u003c\/strong\u003e: 482g\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDimension\u003c\/strong\u003e: 235 x 157 x 21 (mm)\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eISBN-13\u003c\/strong\u003e: 9780197697771\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"DinissaDuvanova","offers":[{"title":"Paperback \/ softback","offer_id":44668162572538,"sku":"9780197697771","price":21.46,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0522\/4297\/2845\/products\/1697819905656_book.jpg?v=1697970011","url":"https:\/\/shulphink.com\/products\/thieves-opportunists-and-autocrats-building-regulatory-states-in-russia-and-kazakhstan-9780197697771","provider":"Shulph Ink","version":"1.0","type":"link"}