A Slow Reckoning: The USSR, the Afghan Communists, and Islam

During the Soviet-Afghan War, the Soviet Union and the Afghan communists had a disregard for Islam, which contributed to the failure of their modernization project. Babrak Karmal instrumentalized Islam in support of his rule, while the Soviets failed to give Islam its due importance as communist ideology and military considerations dominated their decision-making. Only after Mikhail Gorbachev replaced Karmal and prepared to withdraw Soviet forces did the approach to Islam change, but it was too late to salvage the Soviet nation-building project. Soviet leaders only started seriously paying attention to an Islamist threat from Afghanistan to Central Asia after 1986, and they believed the Islamists had little agency and that their retrograde ideology could not find massive appeal among progressive Soviet Muslims.

Format: Hardback
Length: 318 pages
Publication date: 15 February 2024
Publisher: Cornell University Press

A Slow Reckoning delves into the Soviet Union's and the Afghan communists' perspectives and policies towards Islam and Islamism during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). As Vassily Klimentov compellingly illustrates, the Soviet and communist Afghan disregard for Islam serves as a revealing testament to the overarching communist approach to reforming Afghanistan and sheds light on the failure of their modernization project.

A Slow Reckoning unveils how, for the majority of the conflict, Babrak Karmal, the ruler installed by the Soviets, deftly instrumentalized Islam to bolster his rule while maintaining a Marxist-Leninist platform. Similarly, the Soviets at all levels neglected to accord Islam the rightful significance as a component of communist ideology, with communist ideology and military considerations consistently prevailing in their decision-making processes. This approach to Islam underwent a transformative shift only after Mikhail Gorbachev replaced Karmal with Mohammad Najibullah and initiated plans for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Embracing Islam as a replacement for Marxism-Leninism proved to be the correct course of action, however, it arrived too late to rescue the Soviet nation-building project.

A Slow Reckoning also highlights how Soviet leaders only began to take a serious stance towards an Islamist threat emanating from Afghanistan to Central Asia after 1986. While the Soviets had expressed concerns related to Islamism in 1979, only the KGB perceived the threat as potent. The Soviet elites never fully conceptualized Islamism, perpetually viewing it as an ideology that could be wielded at will by the United States, Iran, or Pakistan. They held the belief that Islamists lacked agency and that their regressive ideology had limited appeal among progressive Soviet Muslims. In this regard, they were only partially correct.

Weight: 907g
Dimension: 229 x 152 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9781501773808