WilliamSpaniel
Bargaining over the Bomb: The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations
Bargaining over the Bomb: The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations
💎 Earn 119 Points (£1.19) on this item.
YOU SAVE £1.20
- Condition: Brand new
- UK Delivery times: Usually arrives within 2 - 3 working days
- UK Shipping: Fee starts at £2.39. Subject to product weight & dimension
Bulk ordering. Want 15 or more copies? Get a personalised quote and bigger discounts. Learn more about bulk orders.
Couldn't load pickup availability
- More about Bargaining over the Bomb: The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations
Nuclear agreements like the Iran deal can work, according to this book, which develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. It argues that existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining and that credible agreements can exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate. The model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons.
Format: Paperback / softback
Length: 224 pages
Publication date: 21 February 2019
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Nuclear agreements, such as the Iran deal, have the potential to be effective in preventing nuclear proliferation over time. While it may seem that there are incentives for countries to cheat, formal bargaining models developed in this book suggest that credible agreements can be reached through concessions and negotiations.
Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the role of bargaining in the process. William Spaniel, in his book, explores how credible agreements can be established in which rival states make concessions to discourage rising states from pursuing nuclear weapons. He argues that nuclear negotiations are valuable tools for counter-proliferation efforts.
The book not only demonstrates the existence of settlements but also highlights the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. It examines existing agreements and provides a baseline model for modeling other concerns related to nuclear weapons.
By understanding the dynamics of bargaining and the factors that contribute to successful agreements, nuclear agreements can be a powerful tool in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting global security. However, it is important to note that the success of these agreements depends on a variety of factors, including the willingness of all parties to compromise and the commitment to upholding the terms of the agreement.
Weight: 350g
Dimension: 152 x 228 x 16 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9781108701846
This item can be found in:
UK and International shipping information
UK and International shipping information
UK Delivery and returns information:
- Delivery within 2 - 3 days when ordering in the UK.
- Shipping fee for UK customers from £2.39. Fully tracked shipping service available.
- Returns policy: Return within 30 days of receipt for full refund.
International deliveries:
Shulph Ink now ships to Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, India, Luxembourg Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Arab Emirates, United States of America.
- Delivery times: within 5 - 10 days for international orders.
- Shipping fee: charges vary for overseas orders. Only tracked services are available for most international orders. Some countries have untracked shipping options.
- Customs charges: If ordering to addresses outside the United Kingdom, you may or may not incur additional customs and duties fees during local delivery.
