Capitalising on Constraint: Bailout Politics in Eurozone Countries

This book provides an essential analysis of the negotiations that took place during bailouts in the Eurozone, exploring the constraints on national executives and the extent to which they were able to advocate, resist, shape, or roll back policies imposed by external actors. It highlights the importance of bargaining leverage, credibility, and the limits of conditionality in designing international and European lending during future crises.

\n Format: Hardback
\n Length: 216 pages
\n Publication date: 12 October 2021
\n Publisher: Manchester University Press
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This book is a vital examination of the behind-the-scenes events that occur during and after bailouts in the Eurozone. Over the past decade, five Eurozone governments facing economic challenges received assistance from international lenders, contingent upon the implementation of specific policies outlined in the Memoranda of Understanding. How did these negotiations unfold? What leeway did these governments have in navigating the situation? After the imposition of conditions, to what extent were these governments willing and capable of reversing the changes imposed by their international lenders?

This book delves into the constraints faced by national executives in the five bailed-out countries of the Eurozone during and beyond the crisis, spanning from 2008 to 2019. The authors argue that, despite external market pressure and creditors' conditionality, governments possessed some degree of flexibility during a bailout and were able to advocate, resist, shape, or roll back certain policies demanded by external actors. In certain instances, domestic actors even capitalized on the constraints of conditionality to their advantage.

Capitalizing on Constraint demonstrates that after a bailout program, governments can exercise their discretion to reverse the measures that provided the most significant benefits at a reduced cost. The authors offer valuable insights into the factors influencing bargaining leverage, the significance of credibility, and the boundaries of conditionality that can inform the design of international and European lending during future crises.

\n Weight: 482g\n
Dimension: 241 x 162 x 20 (mm)\n
ISBN-13: 9781526149886\n \n