Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment

Religious conviction is often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs, leading some to argue for religious skepticism. Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment challenges this skeptical conclusion by explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident belief even in the face of epistemic worries. John Pittard argues against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality and criticizes approaches to disagreement that allow for the unproblematic privileging of one's first-person perspective. He emphasizes the importance of rational insight into reasons that favor one's outlook, but challenges narrowly intellectualist accounts of insight. He also considers the implications of accepting the impartiality requirement favored by disagreement skeptics for religious commitment, arguing that it would likely make it irrational to pursue one's favored form of religious life and prevent rational engagement in any religious or irreligious way of life.

Format: Paperback / softback
Length: 360 pages
Publication date: 01 February 2024
Publisher: Oxford University Press Inc

The profound depth of religious disagreement indicates that religious conviction often arises from processes that fail to consistently yield accurate beliefs. Consequently, many have contended that the only rational response to religious disagreements is to embrace religious skepticism, which renounces confident religious belief. However, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment challenges this skeptical stance, elucidating how it may be rational to maintain unwavering belief even in the face of the epistemic concerns raised by disagreement.

John Pittard takes a critical stance against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality that underpins the case for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism. At the same time, he critiques approaches to disagreement that afford the unchallenged privileging of one's first-person perspective. He emphasizes the significance of possessing rational insight into reasons that support one's outlook; however, he challenges narrow intellectualist accounts of insight, arguing that many of the rational insights essential for evaluating religious outlooks cannot be attained solely through analytical reasoning but rather through relevant emotional experiences.

In the second part of the book, Pittard delves into the implications that accepting the impartiality requirement advocated by disagreement skeptics holds for religious commitment. He challenges the prevailing assumption that adherence to rigorous epistemic impartiality would preclude confident religious belief. He further argues, however, that such an impartiality commitment would likely render it irrational to pursue one's preferred form of religious life and might impede one's ability to engage in any religious or irreligious way of life rationally. This concerning conclusion provides grounds for hope that the arguments presented in the book will contribute to a more nuanced and informed understanding of religious disagreements and their implications for religious commitment.

Dimension: 235 x 156 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9780197766514