Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles

This book explores epistemic dilemmas, moral situations where no matter what one does, one fails some moral obligation. It covers a wide range of positions on epistemic dilemmas, from discussions of their nature to arguments that they do not exist to suggestions for how to resolve or live with them. It will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in epistemology working on justification, evidential support, higher-order requirements, or suspension of judgment.

Format: Paperback / softback
Length: 274 pages
Publication date: 29 January 2024
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd

This book presents a collection of original essays by renowned epistemologists that delve into diverse and innovative perspectives on epistemic dilemmas. It is highly probable that moral situations exist where no matter what one chooses, they inevitably fail to fulfill some moral obligation. Can we find an epistemic counterpart to moral dilemmas? Are there instances where we are inevitably bound to violate an epistemic requirement? If such situations exist, when do they arise, and what insights can we gain from them? The contributors to this volume offer a wide range of viewpoints on epistemic dilemmas. The coverage spans from discussions on the essence of epistemic dilemmas to arguments suggesting that such situations do not exist to proposals for resolving or coping with epistemic dilemmas to suggestions for how considering epistemic dilemmas can inform theorizing in other areas of epistemology. Epistemic Dilemmas is a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students in epistemology who are engaged in exploring the nature of justification and evidential support, higher-order requirements, or suspension of judgment.

Weight: 453g
Dimension: 229 x 152 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9780367681852