Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality

According to this book, rationality only constrains what we should believe on the basis of our evidence to a limited extent. The argument takes inspiration from William James' ideas and proposes that epistemic utility theory, which measures epistemic value, and attitudes to epistemic risk, which determine decision-making, determine which beliefs are permitted. This result leads to permissivism about epistemic rationality, as different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different choices of prior beliefs and different posteriors.

Format: Hardback
Length: 224 pages
Publication date: 17 August 2022
Publisher: Oxford University Press

Introduction:
The question of how much rationality constrains what we should believe on the basis of our evidence has been a topic of debate for centuries. In this book, we argue that rationality permits a wide range of beliefs in response to most people and most bodies of evidence. Our argument takes inspiration from William James' ideas in The Will to Believe, and proceeds from two premises.

Epistemic Utility Theory:
The first premise is a theory about the basis of epistemic rationality. It is called epistemic utility theory, and it says that what it is epistemically rational for you to believe is what it would be rational for you to choose if you were given the chance to pick your beliefs and, when picking them, you were to care only about their epistemic value. So, to say which beliefs are permitted, we must say how to measure epistemic value, and which decision rule to use when picking your beliefs.

Attitudes to Epistemic Risk:
The second premise is a claim about attitudes to epistemic risk, and it says that rationality permits many different such attitudes. These attitudes can show up in epistemic utility theory in two ways: in the way you measure epistemic value; and in the decision rule you use to pick beliefs.

Permissivism about Epistemic Rationality:
The result of our argument is permissivism about epistemic rationality. Different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different choices of prior beliefs; given most bodies of evidence, different priors lead to different posteriors; and even once we fix your attitudes to epistemic risk, if they are at all risk-inclined, there is a range of different priors and therefore different posteriors they permit.

Conclusion:
In conclusion, this book explores the extent to which rationality constrains what we should believe on the basis of our evidence. We argue that rationality permits a wide range of beliefs, and that different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different choices of prior beliefs and different posteriors. While there may be some constraints on rationality, they are not as strict as many believe.

Weight: 396g
Dimension: 222 x 146 x 17 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9780192864352