Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox

The lottery paradox challenges the idea that we believe something categorically if we believe it to a high enough degree, leading to a philosophical debate over fifty years. This volume offers new essays that provide compelling reasons for rethinking the debate's fundamentals.

Format: Paperback / softback
Length: 278 pages
Publication date: 10 November 2022
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Beliefs can be categorized into two distinct forms: categorical and graded. Categorical beliefs are those that we hold with absolute certainty, while graded beliefs are those that we hold with a degree of uncertainty. The relationship between these two types of belief has been a subject of intense philosophical debate for over fifty years.

The most straightforward answer to the question of how categorical and graded beliefs hang together is that we believe something categorically if we believe it to a high enough degree. However, this claim is known to give rise to a paradox commonly known as the lottery paradox. This paradox arises when we combine two seemingly near-platitudinal claims about belief: (1) we believe something categorically if we believe it to a high enough degree, and (2) we should update our beliefs in the face of new evidence.

To resolve the lottery paradox, philosophers have proposed a variety of solutions. Some argue that we should only believe things categorically if we have evidence that supports them to a high degree, while others argue that we should always update our beliefs in the face of new evidence, regardless of how certain we are about our previous beliefs.

This volume offers a collection of newly commissioned essays on the lottery paradox, all of which provide compelling reasons for rethinking many of the fundamentals of the debate. The essays cover a wide range of topics, including the nature of belief, the role of evidence in belief formation, and the relationship between belief and probability.

One of the key themes that emerges from the essays is that the lottery paradox is not a fundamental paradox of belief, but rather a result of our intuitive understanding of probability. Many philosophers argue that our intuitive understanding of probability is flawed, and that we should adopt a more sophisticated understanding of probability that takes into account the fact that probability is a measure of belief rather than certainty.

Another theme that emerges from the essays is that the debate over the relationship between categorical and graded belief is not a purely philosophical debate, but also has practical implications for our everyday lives. For example, the debate over whether we should update our beliefs in the face of new evidence can have important implications for fields such as medicine, where doctors must make decisions based on the best available evidence.

In conclusion, the relationship between categorical and graded belief has been a subject of intense philosophical debate for over fifty years. This volume offers a collection of newly commissioned essays on the subject, all of which provide compelling reasons for rethinking many of the fundamentals of the debate. The essays cover a wide range of topics, including the nature of belief, the role of evidence in belief formation, and the relationship between belief and probability. By rethinking these fundamental questions, we can gain a deeper understanding of the nature of belief and its implications for our everyday lives.

Weight: 412g
Dimension: 152 x 227 x 19 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9781108433051