Models and Idealizations in Science: Artifactual and Fictional Approaches

This book provides an introduction to the philosophy of scientific modeling and discusses two recent philosophical conceptions of models: artifactualism and fictionalism. It argues that scientific models must be conceived of as the same kind of entities as literary characters and places, and that the artifactual view of models is a non-representationalist and pragmatic account of modeling. The essays address questions such as the artifactual view of idealization, the use of information theory to elucidate the concepts of abstraction and idealization, the deidealization of models, the nature of scientific fictions, the structural account of representation, and the ontological status of structures.

Format: Paperback / softback
Length: 270 pages
Publication date: 29 May 2022
Publisher: Springer Nature Switzerland AG

This book offers a comprehensive introduction to the philosophy of scientific modeling, while also contributing to the discussion and clarification of two contemporary philosophical conceptions of models: artifactualism and fictionalism. These perspectives can be seen as distinct stances concerning the standard representationalist account of scientific models. By gaining a deeper understanding of these two alternative viewpoints, readers will gain a more profound insight into the nature of models and their role in various scientific disciplines.

Fictionalism has long been a traditional epistemological stance associated with antirealist construals of laws and theories, such as instrumentalism and inferentialism. In contrast, the more recent fictional view of models posits that scientific models must be understood as the same kind of entities as literary characters and places. This approach essentially answers the ontological question concerning the nature of models, which is not necessarily incompatible with a representationalist account of the function of models.

The artifactual view of models is an approach that regards scientific models as epistemic artifacts whose primary purpose is not to represent the phenomena but rather to provide epistemic access to them. It can be conceived of as a non-representationalist and pragmatic account of modeling, which focuses on the construction and utilization of models for different purposes rather than delving into the ontology of models.

The various essays in this book address a range of questions, including the artifactual view of idealization, the application of information theory to elucidate concepts of abstraction and idealization, the deidealization of models, the nature of scientific fictions, the structural account of representation, and the ontological status of structures. By exploring these topics, readers will gain a comprehensive understanding of the philosophical foundations of scientific modeling and its implications for the field.

Weight: 444g
Dimension: 235 x 155 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9783030658045
Edition number: 1st ed. 2021