Perceptual Experience

Christopher S. Hill argues that perceptual experience involves representations of worldly items, which can be explained in biological terms. He maintains that perceptual appearances are relational, viewpoint-dependent properties of external objects, and that these properties can be explained reductively in terms of the representational contents of experiences. He also discusses the various forms of consciousness that perceptual experiences can possess, and argues that phenomenology is metaphysically independent of these forms.

Format: Hardback
Length: 288 pages
Publication date: 01 September 2022
Publisher: Oxford University Press

Christopher S. Hill contends that perceptual experience inherently entails representations of worldly items, and that the pertinent form of representation can be elucidated in broadly biological terms. He subsequently argues that the representational contents of perceptual experiences are perceptual appearances, interpreted as relational, viewpoint-dependent properties of external objects. Additionally, there exists a complementary explanation of how the objects that possess these properties are represented. Hill maintains that perceptual phenomenology can be explained reductively in terms of the representational contents of experiences, and utilizes this doctrine to undermine the traditional arguments for dualism. This treatment of perceptual phenomenology is extended to encompass cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of moods and emotions, and the phenomenology of pain. Hill also provides accounts of the diverse forms of consciousness that perceptual experiences can possess. One objective is to argue that phenomenology is metaphysically independent of these forms of consciousness, and another is to de-mystify the form known as phenomenal consciousness. The book concludes by discussing the relations of various kinds that perceptual experiences bear to higher-level cognitive states, including relations of format, content, and justification or support.

Christopher S. Hill argues that perceptual experience constitutively involves representations of worldly items, and that the pertinent form of representation can be explained in broadly biological terms. He then maintains that the representational contents of perceptual experiences are perceptual appearances, interpreted as relational, viewpoint-dependent properties of external objects. There is also a complementary explanation of how the objects that possess these properties are represented. Hill maintains that perceptual phenomenology can be explained reductively in terms of the representational contents of experiences, and uses this doctrine to undercut the traditional arguments for dualism. This treatment of perceptual phenomenology is expanded to encompass cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of moods and emotions, and the phenomenology of pain. Hill also offers accounts of the various forms of consciousness that perceptual experiences can possess. One aim is to argue that phenomenology is metaphysically independent of these forms of consciousness, and another is to de-mystify the form known as phenomenal consciousness. The book concludes by discussing the relations of various kinds that perceptual experiences bear to higher-level cognitive states, including relations of format, content, and justification or support.

Weight: 586g
Dimension: 240 x 160 x 23 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9780192867766