Physicalism Deconstructed: Levels of Reality and the Mind-Body Problem

Kevin Morris' book challenges non-reductive,levels-based physicalism and argues that it is difficult to make good metaphysical sense of this idea. He suggests that notions like supervenience, physical realization, and grounding fail to articulate a viable non-reductive, levels-based physicalism. The book provides new perspectives on the mind-body problem and is accessible to scholars working in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.

\n Format: Paperback / softback
\n Length: 275 pages
\n Publication date: 08 April 2021
\n Publisher: Cambridge University Press
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Many philosophers have proposed non-reductive,levels-based positions, according to which the physical domain is fundamental, while thought and consciousness are higher-level processes, dependent on and determined by physical processes. In this book, Kevin Morris' careful philosophical and historical critique shows that it is very difficult to make good metaphysical sense of this idea. Notions like supervenience, physical realization, and grounding all fail to articulate a viable non-reductive, levels-based physicalism. Challenging assumptions about the mind-body problem and providing new perspectives on the debate over physicalism, this accessible and comprehensive book will interest scholars working in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.

Introduction:
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in non-reductive, levels-based positions in metaphysics. These positions argue that the physical domain is fundamental, while thought and consciousness are higher-level processes that are dependent on and determined by physical processes. This idea has been proposed by many philosophers, including David Chalmers, Peter Singer, and John Searle.

The Problem with Non-Reductive, Levels-Based Physicalism:
However, Kevin Morris argues that it is very difficult to make good metaphysical sense of this idea. He points out that notions like supervenience, physical realization, and grounding all fail to articulate a viable non-reductive, levels-based physicalism. Supervenience, for example, is the idea that a higher-level property is supervenient on a lower-level property if and only if it is caused by the lower-level property. However, Morris argues that this notion does not work in the case of thought and consciousness. Thought and consciousness are not caused by physical processes, but rather they are emergent properties of the brain.

Physical Realization:
Physical realization is the idea that thought and consciousness are realized in the physical world. This idea is often associated with materialism, which holds that everything in the universe is made of matter. However, Morris argues that physical realization does not work in the case of thought and consciousness. Thought and consciousness are not physical objects, but rather they are mental objects. Mental objects are not realized in the physical world, but rather they are realized in the mind.

Grounding:
Grounding is the idea that thought and consciousness are grounded in the physical world. This idea is often associated with the idea of physicalism, which holds that everything in the universe is physical. However, Morris argues that grounding does not work in the case of thought and consciousness. Thought and consciousness are not grounded in the physical world, but rather they are grounded in the mind.

Conclusion:
In conclusion, Kevin Morris' book provides a careful philosophical and historical critique of non-reductive, levels-based physicalism. He shows that it is very difficult to make good metaphysical sense of this idea, and that notions like supervenience, physical realization, and grounding all fail to articulate a viable non-reductive, levels-based physicalism. This book will interest scholars working in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.

\n Weight: 400g\n
Dimension: 152 x 228 x 18 (mm)\n
ISBN-13: 9781108459068\n \n