Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition

Radical skepticism argues that many of our ordinary beliefs, such as those based on perception or memory, are irrational. This skepticism challenges traditional epistemology and has been defended by Thomas Reid and others. Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition rejects argument-based responses to radical skepticism and develops a commonsense noninferential response based on epistemic intuitions. This response can be endorsed by internalists and externalists and is defended against objections.

\n Format: Hardback
\n Length: 304 pages
\n Publication date: 01 July 2021
\n Publisher: Oxford University Press
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Radical skepticism is a philosophical position that goes to the extreme by claiming that significant portions of our everyday beliefs, such as those derived from perception or memory, are irrational. While the best arguments for this skepticism may seem familiar, even seasoned epistemologists find them strangely seductive. Despite the widespread dismissal of radical skepticism among contemporary philosophers, they cannot agree on the most effective response to the challenge it presents. In the spirit of 18th-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition enters this discussion by undertaking four main tasks.

Firstly, it identifies the strongest arguments for radical skepticism, specifically underdetermination arguments, which highlight the gap between our evidence and our ordinary beliefs based on that evidence. Secondly, it rejects all inferential or argument-based responses to radical skepticism, which aim to provide good noncircular reasoning from the evidence on which we base our ordinary beliefs to the conclusion that those beliefs are probably true. Thirdly, it develops a commonsense noninferential response to radical skepticism with two distinctive features. Firstly, it consciously and extensively relies on epistemic intuitions, which are perceptions about epistemic goods, such as knowledge and rationality. Secondly, it can be endorsed without difficulty by both internalists and externalists in epistemology.

Fourthly, and finally, it defends this commonsense epistemic-intuition-based response to radical skepticism against a variety of objections, including those connected with underdetermination worries, epistemic circularity, disagreement problems, experimental philosophy, and concerns about whether it engages skepticism in a sufficiently serious way.

In conclusion, Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition offers a unique and insightful perspective on the debate surrounding radical skepticism. By identifying the strongest arguments for skepticism and rejecting inferential or argument-based responses, it provides a commonsense noninferential response that relies on epistemic intuitions. This response is capable of accommodating both internalists and externalists in epistemology and is well-defended against a range of objections. It is a valuable contribution to the ongoing discussion of skepticism and epistemology and should be of interest to philosophers and scholars alike.

\n Weight: 610g\n
Dimension: 161 x 242 x 27 (mm)\n
ISBN-13: 9780192898487\n \n