Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning

Scott Soames argues that the revolution in the study of language and mind since the late nineteenth century must be rethought, and that propositions must have contents of both representational and cognitive types to advance. He provides a conception of propositions that allows them to have contents of both sorts, solving several perplexing problems in the philosophy of language and mind.

Format: Paperback / softback
Length: 256 pages
Publication date: 08 September 2020
Publisher: Princeton University Press

Since the late 19th century, a significant shift has occurred in the study of language and mind, prompting a reevaluation of the prevailing perspective. The central notion within this tradition is that propositions are representational, meaning that understanding the meaning of a sentence or the content of a belief necessitates knowledge of the things it represents as being in certain ways and the world's necessary characteristics to conform to these representations. These truth conditions define the sentence or belief. However, it is crucial to recognize that meanings and representational contents are not the sole determinants of propositions. Propositions can also impose conditions on the minds that entertain them.

To advance the study of mind and language, a conception of propositions is essential that encompasses both world-facing and mind-facing content. This breakthrough is provided by Scott Soames, who argues that propositions are repeatable, purely representational cognitive acts or operations that represent the world as being a certain way. These propositions require minds that perform them to satisfy certain cognitive conditions.

One of the key insights of Soames's approach is that propositions can have contents of both the world-facing and mind-facing types. This means that pairs of propositions can be representationally identical, meaning they represent the same world in the same way, but cognitively distinct. For example, a proposition that "the sky is blue" may be representationally identical to a proposition that "you see the sky as blue" but cognitively distinct, as the first proposition does not involve the subject's perception or mental state.

By recognizing the dual nature of propositions, Soames offers new solutions to several perplexing problems in the philosophy of language and mind. For instance, he addresses the issue of how propositions can have truth-value while being subject to change. He argues that propositions can have truth-value because they represent the world in a certain way, regardless of whether minds perceive or believe them. This allows for a more robust understanding of truth and belief.

Moreover, Soames's approach sheds light on the nature of mental representations and the relationship between language and thought. He argues that mental representations are not merely subjective or private but are public and shared by all minds that entertain the same proposition. This means that propositions can have objective truth-value, independent of individual perceptions or beliefs.

In conclusion, the revolution in the study of language and mind since the late 19th century requires a reevaluation of the prevailing perspective. Scott Soames's argument that propositions are repeatable, purely representational cognitive acts or operations that represent the world in a certain way and impose conditions on minds that entertain them offers a breakthrough in our understanding of language and mind. By recognizing the dual nature of propositions and the relationship between world-facing and mind-facing content, Soames provides new solutions to perplexing problems and sheds light on the nature of mental representations and the relationship between language and thought.

Weight: 336g
Dimension: 216 x 140 x 20 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9780691211497