Robust Realism in Ethics: Normative Arbitrariness, Interpersonal Dialogue, and Moral Objectivity

Stephen Ingram presents a metaethical theory based on normative arbitrariness, which claims that moral choice is non-arbitrary and that robustly stance-independent, categorical, irreducibly normative, non-natural moral facts exist. He identifies five ways in which a metaethical theory might fail to capture the non-arbitrariness of moral choice, including claims about the bruteness of moral attitudes or facts, the privileging of some attitudes over others, the claim that some metaethical theories leave a normative deficit, the claim that we own moral reality, and the claim that certain metaethical theories introduce a destabilising contingency into the moral domain. Robust realism is the theory that is best placed to avoid all five of these arbitrariness charges, and Ingram defends epistemological and meta-semantic theories that are friendly to their view, such as a dualistic form of moral intuitionism and a theory of moral mental files.

Format: Hardback
Length: 256 pages
Publication date: 27 July 2023
Publisher: Oxford University Press

Stephen Ingram presents a robustly realistic metaethical theory, rooted in the concept of normative arbitrariness, which he offers the first in-depth analysis. He contends that to fully grasp the normative non-arbitrariness of moral choices, we must embrace the existence of robustly stance-independent, categorical, irreducibly normative, and non-natural moral facts. Specifically, he identifies five potential shortcomings in metaethical theories that hinder their ability to capture the non-arbitrariness of moral choice. The first pertains to claims about the harshness of moral attitudes or facts. The second involves assertions about the favoring of certain attitudes over others. The third pertains to the assertion that some metaethical theories leave a normative deficit. The fourth pertains to the claim that we possess exclusive ownership over moral reality. The fifth pertains to the argument that certain metaethical theories introduce a destabilizing contingency into the moral domain.

Ingram argues that robust realism is the most suitable theory to evade all five of these arbitrariness charges. He then proceeds to demonstrate how robust realists can defend epistemological and meta-semantic theories that align with their perspective. Specifically, he advocates for a dualistic form of moral intuitionism, wherein some moral beliefs are justified through a priori intuitions, while others are grounded in posteriori moral experiences. Furthermore, he presents a theory of moral mental files to explain how moral terms and concepts can refer to robust moral facts.

In conclusion, Stephen Ingram's metaethical theory, based on normative arbitrariness, presents a comprehensive framework for understanding the nature of moral choice. By advocating for robust realism and exploring the complexities of interpersonal moral dialogue, Ingram offers a defense against arbitrariness charges and provides a basis for justifying moral beliefs through intuition and experience. His work contributes to the ongoing discussion in metaethics and offers valuable insights into the nature of moral truth and the role of intuition in moral reasoning.

Weight: 514g
Dimension: 240 x 160 x 20 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9780198886488