Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles

Seemings and intuitions are important in epistemology, but there are many questions that have yet to be answered satisfactorily. This volume presents new research on the nature and epistemic import of seemings and intuitions, offering useful arguments and ideas about the nature of justification, evidential support, intuitions, inquiry, and the nature of inference.

Format: Hardback
Length: 288 pages
Publication date: 19 December 2023
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd

The study of the nature and epistemic significance of seemings and intuitions has been a central focus in philosophical inquiry. Epistemological theories such as phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism place great emphasis on the role of seemings in epistemic justification. These theories argue that seemings are essential to our understanding of how we come to know what we know. However, there remain many unresolved questions concerning seemings. What are the different types of seemings? How do seemings justify? Are seemings related to truth? Do they play a significant role in inquiry?
The chapters in this volume present a diverse range of insightful arguments and innovative ideas about seemings, the nature of justification, evidential support, intuitions, inquiry, and the nature of inference. This book will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the study of knowledge. It explores the nature, scope, and limits of human knowledge and seeks to develop theories that explain how we come to know what we know. Epistemological theories can be divided into two main categories: foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalism holds that knowledge is based on a set of fundamental principles or beliefs that are either innate or discovered through reason. Coherentism, on the other hand, argues that knowledge is based on a network of beliefs that are coherent and interconnected.
Phenomenal conservatism is a foundationalist epistemological theory that emphasizes the role of seemings in epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, our knowledge of the external world is based on our sensory experiences, which are reliable and trustworthy. Phenomenal conservatism holds that our sensory experiences provide us with direct access to the external world and that we cannot know anything beyond what we experience through our senses.
Dogmatism is another foundationalist epistemological theory that emphasizes the role of seemings in epistemic justification. Dogmatism holds that our knowledge of the external world is based on our beliefs, which are either true or false. Dogmatism argues that we cannot know anything beyond what we believe, and that our beliefs are either justified or unjustified based on their truth or falsity.
Inquiry is a central aspect of epistemology, and it involves the process of seeking knowledge through the accumulation of evidence. Inquiry can be divided into two main types: deductive and inductive. Deductive inquiry involves the use of logical reasoning to draw conclusions from premises that are either true or false. Inductive inquiry involves the use of empirical evidence to draw conclusions about the world.
Inference is a process of drawing conclusions from premises that are not necessarily true or false. Inference can be divided into two main types: logical and statistical. Logical inference involves the use of logical reasoning to draw conclusions from premises that are either true or false. Statistical inference involves the use of statistical methods to draw conclusions about the world.
The nature of seemings and intuitions has been a topic of debate in epistemology for many years. Some philosophers argue that seemings and intuitions are essential to our understanding of knowledge, while others argue that they are unreliable and should be ignored.
One argument in favor of the importance of seemings and intuitions is that they provide us with direct access to the external world. According to phenomenal conservatism, our sensory experiences provide us with direct access to the external world and that we cannot know anything beyond what we experience through our senses. Phenomenal conservatism holds that our sensory experiences are reliable and trustworthy and that we cannot know anything beyond what we experience through our senses.
Another argument in favor of the importance of seemings and intuitions is that they provide us with immediate knowledge of the world. According to dogmatism, our beliefs provide us with immediate knowledge of the external world and that we cannot know anything beyond what we believe. Dogmatism holds that our beliefs are either justified or unjustified based on their truth or falsity and that we cannot know anything beyond what we believe.
However, there are also arguments against the importance of seemings and intuitions. Some philosophers argue that seemings and intuitions are unreliable and should be ignored. One argument against the reliability of seemings and intuitions is that they are subject to bias and error. According to phenomenal conservatism, our sensory experiences are subject to bias and error and that we cannot know anything beyond what we experience through our senses. Phenomenal conservatism holds that our sensory experiences are reliable and trustworthy and that we cannot know anything beyond what we experience through our senses.
Another argument against the reliability of seemings and intuitions is that they are subject to the influence of our emotions and desires. According to dogmatism, our beliefs are subject to the influence of our emotions and desires and that we cannot know anything beyond what we believe. Dogmatism holds that our beliefs are either justified or unjustified based on their truth or falsity and that we cannot know anything beyond what we believe.
In conclusion, the study of the nature and epistemic significance of seemings and intuitions has been a central focus in philosophical inquiry. Epistemological theories such as phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism place great emphasis on the role of seemings in epistemic justification. However, there remain many unresolved questions concerning seemings. What are the different types of seemings? How do seemings justify? Are seemings related to truth? Do they play a significant role in inquiry?
The chapters in this volume present a diverse range of insightful arguments and innovative ideas about seemings, the nature of justification, evidential support, intuitions, inquiry, and the nature of inference. This book will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.

Weight: 707g
Dimension: 229 x 152 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9781032289601