The Puzzle of Clientelism: Political Discretion and Elections Around the World

The Element presents cross-national data on reelection rates of lower house national legislators, showing that clientelism and vote-buying are low/high in countries with low/high reelection rates. It explains why politicians continue clientelist activities despite not securing reelection, and provides a thorough review of the literature on clientelism. It suggests that clientelism evolves with economic development, assuming new forms in highly developed democracies but never disappearing.

Format: Paperback / softback
Length: 75 pages
Publication date: 23 February 2023
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

This Element presents newly-collected cross-national data on reelection rates of lower house national legislators from almost 100 democracies around the world. Reelection rates are low/high in countries where clientelism and vote buying are high/low. Drawing on theory developed to study lobbying, the authors explain why politicians continue clientelist activities although they do not secure reelection. The Element also provides a thorough review of the last decade of literature on clientelism, which the authors define as discretionary resource distribution by political actors. The combination of novel empirical data and theoretically-grounded analysis provides a radically new perspective on clientelism. Finally, the Element suggests that clientelism evolves with economic development, assuming new forms in highly developed democracies but never entirely disappearing.

This Element presents newly-collected cross-national data on reelection rates of lower house national legislators from almost 100 democracies around the world. Reelection rates are low/high in countries where clientelism and vote buying are high/low. Drawing on theory developed to study lobbying, the authors explain why politicians continue clientelist activities although they do not secure reelection. The Element also provides a thorough review of the last decade of literature on clientelism, which the authors define as discretionary resource distribution by political actors. The combination of novel empirical data and theoretically-grounded analysis provides a radically new perspective on clientelism. Finally, the Element suggests that clientelism evolves with economic development, assuming new forms in highly developed democracies but never entirely disappearing.

Weight: 135g
ISBN-13: 9781009323215