The Tinkering Mind: Agency, Cognition, and the Extended Mind

Epistemic agency is a concept that is central to many areas of philosophy and the cognitive sciences, including dual process theories, metacognition, mindreading, self-control, and moral agency. The Tinkering Mind argues that epistemic agency has two distinct and incompatible definitions, which have surprising and counterintuitive consequences. The book demonstrates that if epistemic agency is a form of intentional action, then the radical theory of extended cognition must be true. If, on the other hand, epistemic agency is not intentional action but evaluative agency, then intentional epistemic actions like deliberation are not truly cognitive but merely catalytic.

Format: Hardback
Length: 208 pages
Publication date: 06 October 2022
Publisher: Oxford University Press

Epistemic agency is a fundamental concept that holds significant importance in various branches of philosophy and the cognitive sciences. It plays a pivotal role in dual process theories of cognition, as well as in theories of metacognition, mindreading, self-control, and moral agency. However, the exact nature of epistemic agency remains a subject of ongoing debate. In his book, "The Tinkering Mind," author David Deutsch argues that epistemic agency can be defined in two distinct and incompatible ways.

The first definition of epistemic agency is as intentional mental action. According to this perspective, epistemic agents are individuals who engage in conscious and deliberate mental processes to acquire and update their knowledge. They use their cognitive abilities to make decisions, form beliefs, and take actions based on the information they possess. This definition aligns with the traditional view of agency, which emphasizes the role of conscious intention and volition in human behavior.

The second definition of epistemic agency is as a distinct non-voluntary form of evaluative agency. In this view, epistemic agents are not necessarily conscious of their mental processes or the decisions they make. Instead, they are characterized by their ability to evaluate the available information and make judgments based on that evaluation. This definition suggests that epistemic agency is not solely a matter of intentional action but also involves a non-conscious evaluative component.

The core argument of "The Tinkering Mind" is that both definitions of epistemic agency lead to surprising and counterintuitive consequences. If epistemic agency is defined as intentional mental action, then this implies that the radical theory of extended cognition must be true. The radical theory of extended cognition suggests that the mind is not limited to the brain and that mental processes can extend beyond the physical boundaries of the body. This implies that epistemic agents can have mental states and experiences that are not directly accessible to their physical bodies, such as thoughts, beliefs, and desires.

On the other hand, if epistemic agency is defined as a distinct non-voluntary form of evaluative agency, then intentional epistemic actions like deliberation are not truly cognitive but merely catalytic. This means that the mental processes involved in deliberation are not essential for the acquisition or updating of knowledge. Instead, the decision-making process itself is the product of non-conscious evaluative processes.

The distinction between these two options sheds new light on various and diverse philosophical and psychological debates. For example, it challenges the traditional view of agency, which emphasizes the conscious intention and volition of the agent. It also raises questions about the nature of consciousness and the relationship between the mind and the body. Additionally, the distinction between epistemic agency and evaluative agency has implications for debates on choice and self-control. It suggests that the decision-making process may involve non-conscious evaluative processes that are beyond the control of the conscious mind.

In conclusion, epistemic agency is a complex and multifaceted concept that has significant implications for philosophy and the cognitive sciences. The Tinkering Mind argues that epistemic agency can be defined in two distinct and incompatible ways, leading to surprising and counterintuitive consequences. The distinction between these two options sheds new light on various philosophical and psychological debates, challenging traditional views of agency and consciousness. As our understanding of epistemic agency continues to evolve, it will be important to explore these concepts further to deepen our understanding of human cognition and behavior.

Weight: 372g
Dimension: 143 x 224 x 20 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9780192894267