Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles

The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles states that no two objects can be purely qualitatively or intrinsically indiscernible, and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra provides two positive arguments for it. He also presents two new arguments against restricted versions of the principle. The conclusion is drawn that there are no objects that differ only numerically.

Format: Hardback
Length: 144 pages
Publication date: 22 September 2022
Publisher: Oxford University Press

The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles asserts that, invariably, no two (concrete) objects can solely differ in numerical attributes. This is the most lenient interpretation of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra contends that there is no trivial version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, as the commonly accepted version of the principle is compatible with objects differing solely in numerical characteristics. He presents two compelling arguments in favor of the Principle: one rooted in Humean considerations, excluding a specific type of necessary connection between distinct objects, and the other based on notions regarding the grounds for objects possessing certain properties. Additionally, this book introduces two novel objections against restricted versions of the principle, which assert that, necessarily, no two objects can be purely qualitatively indiscernible or intrinsically purely qualitatively indiscernible. Furthermore, it is argued that one of the arguments supporting the weakest version of the principle can be extended to abstract objects. The ultimate conclusion reached is that, necessarily, there exist no objects, whether abstract or concrete, that solely differ in numerical attributes.

The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is a fundamental concept in metaphysics that asserts that, necessarily, no two (concrete) objects can solely differ in numerical attributes. This is the weakest version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles.

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that there is no trivial version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, as the commonly accepted version of the principle is compatible with objects differing solely in numerical characteristics.

He presents two compelling arguments in favor of the Principle: one rooted in Humean considerations, excluding a specific type of necessary connection between distinct objects, and the other based on notions regarding the grounds for objects possessing certain properties.

Additionally, this book introduces two novel objections against restricted versions of the principle, which assert that, necessarily, no two objects can be purely qualitatively indiscernible or intrinsically purely qualitatively indiscernible.

Furthermore, it is argued that one of the arguments supporting the weakest version of the principle can be extended to abstract objects.

The ultimate conclusion reached is that, necessarily, there exist no objects, whether abstract or concrete, that solely differ in numerical attributes.

Weight: 308g
Dimension: 145 x 224 x 18 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9780192866868