Vagueness and Thought

Vagueness is the study of concepts that admit borderline cases, such as being bald. It concerns the sorts of attitudes we ought to have towards propositions we know to be borderline and is explicated in terms of its role in thought. Part I outlines central questions regarding the logic and epistemology of vagueness, criticizes extant approaches, and proposes a positive theory of vagueness. Part II concerns issues in the epistemology of vagueness, including the ramifications of vague thoughts on evidence, ignorance, desire, probability theory, and decision theory. Part III concerns the logic of vagueness, including the interaction between vagueness and modality, vague identity, and the paradoxes of higher-order vagueness. Bacon suggests that some familiar philosophical notions need to be revised.

Format: Paperback / softback
Length: 362 pages
Publication date: 24 March 2022
Publisher: Oxford University Press

Vagueness is a fascinating field of study that delves into the examination of concepts that exhibit borderline cases. It revolves around the notion that certain properties, such as being bald, can be ambiguous because they lack a clear-cut definition. This ambiguity arises because there exist individuals who fall somewhere in between being definitively bald and definitively not bald.

The epistemology of vagueness is concerned with the appropriate attitudes we should hold towards borderline propositions. It explores questions such as whether it is possible to determine whether a borderline bald man is indeed bald, whether two individuals with access to the same facts can reasonably disagree about his baldness, and whether it matters in practical decision-making whether he is bald.

In his groundbreaking work, Andrew Bacon develops a novel theory of vagueness. According to this theory, vagueness is not solely a linguistic phenomenon but rather a property inherent in propositions. It is explicated in terms of its role in thought and how it affects our understanding of the world. Bacon argues that language plays a limited role in explaining the central puzzles of vagueness and that a more comprehensive approach is necessary.

Part I of the book sets the stage for exploring the central questions regarding the logic and epistemology of vagueness. It critically examines existing approaches and highlights their limitations. Part II delves into issues in the epistemology of vagueness, touching on the ramifications of vague thoughts on various fields such as the study of evidence, ignorance, desire, probability theory, and decision theory. By examining the effects of vague information on our beliefs about the precise, Bacon proposes a positive theory of vagueness.

Part III focuses on the logic of vagueness, exploring the interplay between vagueness and modality, vague identity, and the paradoxes of higher-order vagueness. Bacon suggests that certain familiar philosophical notions, such as the concept of a fundamental proposition, a possible world, and precisification, need to be revised in order to better understand the nature of vagueness.

Through his comprehensive and insightful analysis, Andrew Bacon provides a fresh perspective on vagueness. His theory challenges traditional notions and offers a more nuanced understanding of this complex concept. The book is a valuable resource for scholars and researchers in the fields of philosophy, logic, and epistemology, as well as anyone interested in exploring the boundaries of knowledge and understanding.

Weight: 572g
Dimension: 157 x 233 x 27 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9780192856081