Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation

Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification distinguish between having good reasons for a belief and basing a belief on good reasons. There is no widely accepted, counter-example-free account of the basing relation, making further inquiry into this area crucial for epistemology. Well-Founded Belief, a collection of 16 essays by leading epistemologists, explores the nature of the basing relation and its applications, including epistemic disjunctivism, epistemic injustice, agency, epistemic conservativism, epistemic grounding, epistemic genealogy, practical reasoning, and practical knowledge.

Format: Paperback / softback
Length: 336 pages
Publication date: 13 June 2022
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd

Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification make a vital distinction between having good reasons for a belief and basing one's belief on good reasons. While the most natural account of basing is causal, a belief is based on a reason only if it is properly caused by the reason. However, there is no widely accepted, counter-example-free account of the basing relation among contemporary epistemologists. Therefore, further inquiry into the nature of the basing relation is of paramount importance for epistemology. Without an acceptable account of the basing relation, epistemological theories remain incomplete and vulnerable to errors that can arise when authors assume an implausible view of what it takes for beliefs to be held on the basis of reasons.

Well-Founded Belief is a collection of 16 essays written by leading epistemologists that delves into this crucial topic in greater detail. The chapters in this collection are divided into two broad categories: (i) the nature of the basing relation; and (ii) basing and its applications.

The chapters in the first section focus on positively characterizing the epistemic basing relation and critiquing existing accounts of it, including extant accounts of the relationship between epistemic basing and propositional and doxastic justification. These chapters aim to provide a clearer understanding of the epistemic basing relation and identify any shortcomings in current accounts.

The latter chapters in the collection connect epistemic basing with other topics of interest in epistemology, such as epistemic disjunctivism, epistemic injustice, agency, epistemic conservativism, epistemic grounding, epistemic genealogy, practical reasoning, and practical knowledge. These chapters explore how epistemic basing relates to these broader issues and how it can inform our understanding of knowledge and justification.

Overall, Well-Founded Belief is a valuable resource for epistemologists, philosophers, and anyone interested in the foundations of knowledge and justification. The essays in this collection provide insightful perspectives on the nature of the basing relation and its applications, and they contribute to the ongoing discussion in epistemology.

Weight: 620g
Dimension: 229 x 152 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9781032337333