Wittgenstein and Russell

Wittgenstein's response to Russell's theories of judgment in 1913 is crucial for his early philosophical development, leading to the conceptions of proposition and logic in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It also touches on his rejection of Russell's and Frege's logicisms, critique of causal-behavioristic philosophy, Russellian origins of privacy, and discussion of surveyability of mathematical proof.

Format: Paperback / softback
Length: 106 pages
Publication date: 28 March 2024
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Russell's theories of judgment have been a recurring theme in Wittgenstein's philosophical endeavors, and this Element delves into Wittgenstein's critical assessments of Russell's ideas during the summer of 1913. Wittgenstein's response to these criticisms holds immense significance for his early philosophical development, laying the groundwork for his later conceptions of proposition and logic in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Furthermore, this Element explores various facets of Wittgenstein's responses to Russell, including his rejection of Russell's and Frege's logicisms in the Tractatus, his critique of Russell's causal-behavioristic philosophy of mind in his middle period, the Russellian origins of notions of privacy explored dialectically in Philosophical Investigations, and the discussion of surveyability of mathematical proof in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, which is yet another response to Russellian logicism.

Russell's theories of judgment have been a recurring theme in Wittgenstein's philosophical endeavors, and this Element delves into Wittgenstein's critical assessments of Russell's ideas during the summer of 1913. Wittgenstein's response to these criticisms holds immense significance for his early philosophical development, laying the groundwork for his later conceptions of proposition and logic in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Furthermore, this Element explores various facets of Wittgenstein's responses to Russell, including his rejection of Russell's and Frege's logicisms in the Tractatus, his critique of Russell's causal-behavioristic philosophy of mind in his middle period, the Russellian origins of notions of privacy explored dialectically in Philosophical Investigations, and the discussion of surveyability of mathematical proof in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, which is yet another response to Russellian logicism.

Russell's theories of judgment have been a recurring theme in Wittgenstein's philosophical endeavors, and this Element delves into Wittgenstein's critical assessments of Russell's ideas during the summer of 1913. Wittgenstein's response to these criticisms holds immense significance for his early philosophical development, laying the groundwork for his later conceptions of proposition and logic in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Furthermore, this Element explores various facets of Wittgenstein's responses to Russell, including his rejection of Russell's and Frege's logicisms in the Tractatus, his critique of Russell's causal-behavioristic philosophy of mind in his middle period, the Russellian origins of notions of privacy explored dialectically in Philosophical Investigations, and the discussion of surveyability of mathematical proof in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, which is yet another response to Russellian logicism.

Russell's theories of judgment have been a recurring theme in Wittgenstein's philosophical endeavors, and this Element delves into Wittgenstein's critical assessments of Russell's ideas during the summer of 1913. Wittgenstein's response to these criticisms holds immense significance for his early philosophical development, laying the groundwork for his later conceptions of proposition and logic in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Furthermore, this Element explores various facets of Wittgenstein's responses to Russell, including his rejection of Russell's and Frege's logicisms in the Tractatus, his critique of Russell's causal-behavioristic philosophy of mind in his middle period, the Russellian origins of notions of privacy explored dialectically in Philosophical Investigations, and the discussion of surveyability of mathematical proof in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, which is yet another response to Russellian logicism.

Weight: 166g
ISBN-13: 9781108925099