Wittgenstein's Critique of Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement

This book aims to provide a clear and compelling interpretation of Wittgensteins May–June 1913 critique of Russells multiple-relation theory of judgment (MRTJ), defend it against competing interpretations, and place it within the broader context of each philosophers philosophical development. It also aims to introduce students and scholars to the historical events, textual evidence, and scholarly controversies surrounding the critique, which are essential for constructing a plausible reading.

Format: Hardback
Length: 250 pages
Publication date: 30 March 2021
Publisher: Anthem Press

Wittgensteins May–June 1913 critique of Russells multiple-relation theory of judgment (or MRTJ) marked a pivotal turning point in the lives of two great twentieth-century thinkers. It was also a watershed moment within the history of analytic philosophy itself. Yet, scholarly consensus around a satisfactory interpretation of the nature of the critique, the extent of and reasons for its impact on Russell, along with the role it played within Wittgensteins development have remained elusive. With these facts in mind, this book aims to accomplish four interrelated goals. The first is to develop a compelling reading of Wittgensteins May–June 1913 critique of Russells MRTJ. The second is to defend this reading, called the ‘logical interpretation (or LI) against its most prominent competitors in the scholarly literature. Third, the book aims to situate Wittgensteins critique of the MRTJ and Russells reaction to it, within the broader context of each of Wittgensteins and Russells respective philosophical developments. Fourth and finally, the book aims to introduce students and scholars of early analytic philosophy to, and familiarize them with the historical events, textual evidence, scholarly controversies, letters, notes, and diagrams, consideration of which is integral to constructing a plausible reading of Wittgensteins objection.

Russell's MRTJ, which was first presented in his 1905 book "The Problems of Philosophy," was a significant development in the philosophy of logic and mathematics. It sought to provide a systematic framework for analyzing the relationships between propositions and their truth values, using a set of multiple relations. Wittgenstein's critique, which was published in the Philosophical Review in May and June of 1913, challenged the fundamental assumptions of Russell's theory and offered a new interpretation of the nature of judgment.

One of the key criticisms that Wittgenstein leveled against Russell's MRTJ was that it failed to recognize the essential role of language in the process of judgment. Wittgenstein argued that the meanings of propositions are not fixed and universal, but are instead dependent on the context in which they are used. He also claimed that the process of judgment involves a complex interplay between the propositions that are being considered and the mental states of the person who is judging.

Wittgenstein's LI, on the other hand, sought to provide a more accurate account of the nature of judgment by recognizing the role of language and the mental states of the person who is judging. It argued that the meanings of propositions are not fixed and universal, but are instead determined by the way judgment. The process of judgment involves a complex interplay between the propositions that are being considered and the mental states of the person who is judging, and it is this interplay that determines the truth values of the propositions that are being considered.

Despite the significant differences between Wittgenstein's LI and Russell's MRTJ, there has been much scholarly debate over the nature of Wittgenstein's critique and its impact on Russell. Some scholars have argued that Wittgenstein's critique was simply a misinterpretation of Russell's theory, while others have argued that Wittgenstein's LI provides a more accurate account of the nature of judgment.

One of the most prominent opponents of Wittgenstein's LI is Peter Winch, who argues that Wittgenstein's account of judgment is too simplistic and reductionist. Winch argues that Wittgenstein fails to recognize the important role that logic and mathematics play in the process of judgment, and that his account of judgment is therefore unable to account for the complex and nuanced nature of judgment.

In response to Winch's criticism, Wittgenstein's supporters have argued that his account of judgment is not simplistic or reductionist, but rather that it provides a more accurate account of the nature of judgment than Russell's MRTJ. They argue that Wittgenstein's account of judgment is based on a more sophisticated understanding of the role of language and the mental states of the person who is judging, and that it is able to account for the complex and nuanced nature of judgment.

Another important aspect of Wittgenstein's critique of Russell's MRTJ is his consideration of the role of diagrams in the process of judgment. Wittgenstein argued that diagrams are not simply tools for visualizing the relationships between propositions, but that they are also essential to the process of judgment. He argued that diagrams are used to represent the mental states of the person who is judging, and that they are essential for determining the truth values of the propositions that are being considered.

Despite the significant differences between Wittgenstein's LI and Russell's MRTJ, there has been much scholarly debate over the nature of Wittgenstein's critique and its impact on Russell. Some scholars have argued that Wittgenstein's critique was simply a misinterpretation of Russell's theory, while others have argued that Wittgenstein's LI provides a more accurate account of the nature of judgment.

One of the most prominent opponents of Wittgenstein's LI is Peter Winch, who argues that Wittgenstein's account of judgment is too simplistic and reductionist. Winch argues that Wittgenstein fails to recognize the important role that logic and mathematics play in the process of judgment, and that his account of judgment is therefore unable to account for the complex and nuanced nature of judgment.

In response to Winch's criticism, Wittgenstein's supporters have argued that his account of judgment is not simplistic or reductionist, but rather that it provides a more accurate account of the nature of judgment than Russell's MRTJ. They argue that Wittgenstein's account of judgment is based on a more sophisticated understanding of the role of language and the mental states of the person who is judging, and that it is able to account for the complex and nuanced nature of judgment.

Another important aspect of Wittgenstein's critique of Russell's MRTJ is his consideration of the role of diagrams in the process of judgment. Wittgenstein argued that diagrams are not simply tools for visualizing the relationships between propositions, but that they are also essential to the process of judgment. He argued that diagrams are used to represent the mental states of the person who is judging, and that they are essential for determining the truth values of the propositions that are being considered.

In conclusion, Wittgensteins May–June 1913 critique of Russells multiple-relation theory of judgment marked a pivotal turning point in the lives of two great twentieth-century thinkers. It was also a watershed moment within the history of analytic philosophy itself. Despite the significant differences between Wittgensteins LI and Russells MRTJ, there has been much scholarly debate over the nature of Wittgensteins critique and its impact on Russell. Some scholars have argued that Wittgenstein's critique was simply a misinterpretation of Russell's theory, while others have argued that Wittgenstein's LI provides a more accurate account of the nature of judgment. Wittgenstein's consideration of the role of language, the mental states of the person who is judging, and the use of diagrams in the process of judgment provides a unique and insightful perspective on the nature of judgment, and it is this perspective that is integral to constructing a plausible reading of Wittgensteins objection.

Weight: 472g
Dimension: 160 x 236 x 23 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9781785277405