Rejecting Compromise: Legislators' Fear of Primary Voters

Legislators often reject compromise proposals due to fear of punishment from voters in primary elections, which can lead to gridlock and hurt policy interests. This book suggests that improving the likelihood of legislative compromise may require moving negotiations outside of the public spotlight.

Format: Paperback / softback
Length: 182 pages
Publication date: 11 February 2021
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Legislative solutions to pressing problems like balancing the budget, climate change, and poverty often require compromise. However, national, state, and local legislators often reject compromise proposals that would move policy in their preferred direction. This intriguing and relevant investigation into how politicians think reveals that legislators refuse compromise and exacerbate gridlock because they fear punishment from voters in primary elections. Prioritizing these electoral interests can lead lawmakers to act in ways that hurt their policy interests and overlook the broader electorate's preferences by representing only a subset of voters with rigid positions. With their solution-oriented approach, Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge-Yong demonstrate that improving the likelihood of legislative compromise may require moving negotiations outside of the public spotlight. Highlighting key electoral motives underlying polarization, this book is an excellent resource for scholars and students studying Congress, American politics, public policy, and political behavior.

Legislative solutions to pressing problems like balancing the budget, climate change, and poverty often require compromise. However, national, state, and local legislators often reject compromise proposals that would move policy in their preferred direction. This intriguing and relevant investigation into how politicians think reveals that legislators refuse compromise and exacerbate gridlock because they fear punishment from voters in primary elections. Prioritizing these electoral interests can lead lawmakers to act in ways that hurt their policy interests and overlook the broader electorate's preferences by representing only a subset of voters with rigid positions. With their solution-oriented approach, Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge-Yong demonstrate that improving the likelihood of legislative compromise may require moving negotiations outside of the public spotlight. Highlighting key electoral motives underlying polarization, this book is an excellent resource for scholars and students studying Congress, American politics, public policy, and political behavior.

Weight: 292g
Dimension: 229 x 152 x 18 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9781108738279