Strategic Analysis of Judicial Behavior: A Comparative Perspective

The past decade has seen a surge of work on strategic accounts of judicial behavior, which emphasize the interdependent nature of judicial decisions and the role of preferences and institutions. Studies have used various methodological approaches to provide insight into the effect of internal and external actors on judges' choices, but there are still opportunities for further progress.

\n Format: Paperback / softback
\n Length: 75 pages
\n Publication date: 17 June 2021
\n Publisher: Cambridge University Press
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The past decade has seen a remarkable global surge in research dedicated to shedding light on judicial behavior: the decisions judges make and the impact of those decisions. Our focus lies in strategic accounts of judicial behavior, which are distinct in one crucial aspect. Unlike other approaches to judging, preferences and institutions play a central role, but strategic accounts uniquely emphasize the interconnected and strategic nature of judicial decisions. On strategic accounts, judges do not make decisions in isolation but rather consider the preferences and likely actions of other actors, including their colleagues, superiors, politicians, and the public.

In this essay, we survey the major methodological approaches employed in conducting strategic analysis and explore how scholars have leveraged them to gain insights into the influence of internal and external actors on judges' choices. While these studies have made significant strides in understanding judicial behavior, there remains ample room for further progress. We identify four key opportunities for advancement in the conclusion.

\n Weight: 108g\n
Dimension: 151 x 227 x 8 (mm)\n
ISBN-13: 9781009048859\n \n