Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements

Bart Streumer defends an error theory about all normative judgments, which states that they are beliefs that ascribe normative properties that do not exist. He argues that our inability to believe this theory makes it more likely to be true, as it undermines objections and revisionary alternatives. He also sketches how other philosophical views can be defended in a similar way and how philosophers should modify their method if there can be true theories that we cannot believe.

Format: Paperback / softback
Length: 256 pages
Publication date: 30 June 2023
Publisher: Oxford University Press

In his book "Unbelievable Errors," Bart Streumer presents an intriguing error theory that encompasses a wide range of normative judgments, including moral, practical, epistemic, and instrumental ones. According to this theory, these judgments are not only false but also beliefs that ascribe normative properties to things that do not actually possess these properties. This means that all normative judgments are ultimately erroneous.

Despite the seemingly devastating implications of this error theory, Streumer argues that we cannot believe it. However, he contends that this fact does not pose a problem for the theory itself but rather strengthens its validity. Streumer explains that our inability to believe the error theory undermines objections to it, makes it more difficult to reject its arguments, and weakens revisionary alternatives to it.

To illustrate how other philosophical views can be similarly defended, Streumer offers examples and suggests that philosophers should modify their method if there are true theories that we cannot believe. He concludes that making philosophical progress requires a clear distinction between the truth of a theory and our ability to believe it.

In summary, "Unbelievable Errors" presents a thought-provoking error theory that challenges our conventional understanding of normative judgments. While it may seem paradoxical to believe in false beliefs, Streumer's arguments and examples suggest that our inability to believe this theory can actually strengthen its validity and contribute to philosophical progress. Philosophers should be open to exploring and refining their methods in light of such theories.

Weight: 312g
Dimension: 135 x 215 x 20 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9780198892946